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Abstract: Urban sustainability transitions have attracted increasing academic interest. 
However, the political-institutional contexts, in which these urban sustainability transitions 
unfold and by which they are incited, shaped, or inhibited, have received much less attention. 
This is why we aim at extending previous studies of sustainability transitions by incorporating 
a multi-level governance perspective. While multi-level governance has been a long-standing 
theme in political science research, it has remained under-explored in the study of 
sustainability transitions. This claim is the starting point of our comparative analysis of urban 
sustainability transitions in Brighton (UK), Dresden (Germany), Genk (Belgium) and Stockholm 
(Sweden). Our approach “brings the politics back in” by elucidating the dynamics of power 
concentration and power dispersion generated by different national governance contexts. In 
our analysis, we explore which opportunities and obstacles these diverse governance 
contexts provide for urban sustainability transitions.  
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1 Introduction 
One of the key frameworks in the field of sustainability transitions is the multi-level 
perspective (MLP) 1 . Originating from science and technology studies and evolutionary 
economics, it adopts a systems perspective. As such “the MLP is an abstract analytical 
framework that identifies relations between general theoretical principles and mechanisms” 
(Geels and Schot, 2010, p. 19). Therefore, the MLP has been criticised for lacking a conception 
of agency (Geels, 2011, 29-31; Markard et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2005). Or, as Geels and Schot 
put it, agency remains “backgrounded” in the MLP (Geels and Schot, 2010, p. 28). The same 
criticism has been made of the technological innovation systems approach (e.g. Kern, 2015; 
Markard and Truffer, 2008), another key framework within the field of sustainability 
transitions, which has increasingly been used to focus the analysis on how well particular 
functions are fulfilled by the system (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007; Hekkert and 
Negro, 2009).  
A number of recent studies have therefore attempted to address this gap and to bring agency 
to the fore (e.g. Avelino and Wittmayer, 2015; Bergek et al., 2015; Hess, 2014; Raven et al., 
2016). For example, a special section on “Actors, Strategies and Resources in Sustainability 
Transitions” was published in the journal Technological Forecasting and Social Change. It 
“aims to provide a closer look at how strategies, resources and capabilities of individuals, 
firms and other organizations impact the overall system and trigger transformation processes, 
and how these changes at the system level feed-back into the observed strategies at the actor 
level” (Farla et al., 2012, p. 992). Similarly, a stream of papers on the politics of ”protective 
spaces” explores how actors try to achieve institutional change which is favourable to ”their” 
desired niche technologies (Raven et al., 2016; Smith and Raven, 2012). Others have explored 
the role of agency in transition processes by studying civil society actors and social 
movements, that is so-called “grassroots innovations” (Frantzeskaki et al. 2016, Seyfang and 
Smith, 2007). They illustrate how societal change can be promoted by non-state actors from 
the bottom-up (e.g. Boyer, 2015; Dóci et al., 2015; Feola and Nunes, 2014; Seyfang and 
Haxeltine, 2012; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013). This literature on the agency of actors within 
transition processes was also partly a response to early criticisms that studies of sustainability 
transitions did not pay enough attention to the politics of such processes (e.g. Meadowcroft, 
2009; Meadowcroft, 2011; Scrase and Smith, 2009; Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith et al., 
2005). In the meantime, the politics of transitions has become a core research strand within 
the literature (e.g. see Avelino et al., 2016; Geels, 2014; Markard et al., 2016; Normann, 2015). 
The agency of actors is of course partly shaped by existing dominant socio-technical 
configurations (which is what transitions research has paid much attention to) as well as wider 
institutional contexts. Institutions are widely acknowledged to shape transition processes and 
institutional change is considered key for transitions to unfold (e.g. Brown et al., 2013; 
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Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2016). However, our argument is 
that wider institutional contexts (which are not normally conceptualised to be part of the 
regime, such as the nature of the political system in a country) are key in shaping agency and 
stretch over various governance levels (e.g. national, regional, local). These need to be 
systematically analysed, rather than simply distinguishing between the “system level” and the 
“actor level” as Farla et al. (2012) propose. We argue that existing research on transitions 
focuses on one level of governance, only. In the early literature, research predominantly 
focused on the national level (most of the research referred to above), while more recently 
there has been a lot of work on urban sustainability transitions (see for example Bulkeley et 
al., 2011; Ernst et al., 2016; Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Moloney and Horne, 2015; Truffer and 
Coenen, 2012; Wittmayer et al., 2015; Wolfram, 2016; Wolfram and Frantzeskaki, 2016). 
Bulkeley et al. (2011) for example focus on urban responses to climate change and how such 
efforts are shaped by the dynamic tension between processes of experimentation and efforts 
to promote systemic change towards low carbon futures. Hodson and Marvin (2010) point 
out that many cities have aspirations to manage transitions towards more sustainable cities 
and develop a framework to better understand city scale transition processes. Many of these 
studies, however, focus mainly on the agency of local actors but do not cover their wider 
multi-level governance contexts, or do not do so explicitly, or not in a well conceptualised 
manner. 
The novelty of our proposed analytical approach is to focus on the local level while specifically 
conceptualising how wider multi-level governance structures shape the agency of local actors. 
We argue that the concept of multi-level governance is useful in the context of studying 
sustainability transitions because it (1) allows analysis to explore the influence of institutional 
structures at different governance levels and (2) captures the agency of state as well as non-
state actors. Moving beyond traditional forms of governing by the state, it includes the agency 
of societal actors such as the private sector, academia, or civil society. The concept of multi-
level governance expresses a dispersion of political authority across multiple territorial levels 
(rather than the MLP levels of niches, regimes and landscapes). State and societal actors 
interact in both vertical and horizontal directions across international, transnational, 
European, national, regional and local levels.  While multi-level governance has been a long-
standing theme in political science research, it has remained under-explored in the study of 
sustainability transitions. It has already been suggested that the study of transitions within 
cities should account for the multi-level institutional contexts, in which these evolve (Hodson 
and Marvin, 2012).  
We address this research gap through our comparative analysis of urban sustainability 
transitions in Brighton (UK), Dresden (Germany), Genk (Belgium) and Stockholm (Sweden). In 
our study, we elucidate the embeddedness of local agency in multi-level governance contexts 
by distinguishing between four different types of political systems. By doing so, we contribute 
to the emerging research on the politics of transitions by elucidating the dynamics of power 
concentration and power dispersion which characterise different governance contexts. Our 
approach, therefore, replies to the sustained call for extending analysis beyond detailed micro 
studies of urban initiatives to take into consideration the wider institutional contexts of local 
agency (Hodson and Marvin, 2012; Markard et al., 2012). It also replies to the sustained call 
for comparative studies of sustainability transitions (Markard et al., 2012). We argue that a 
comparative perspective is especially important in analysing the role of institutional 
structures in shaping agency: Without such systematically designed comparative research 
that distinguishes between different political-institutional contexts, any finding can be 
attributed to a specific institutional context. 
In order to hedge calls for putting agency central in the study of (urban) sustainability 
transitions, we focus on the collective agency of local transition initiatives (TIs), operating 
within the four city-regions studied. We define TIs as collective agents who aim to drive 
transformative change towards environmental sustainability (so an urban sustainability 
transition in their city-region) with their locally-based activities, i.e. the enactment of 
sustainable ways of organising (structures), thinking (culture), and doing (practice) 
(Frantzeskaki and de Haan, 2009). We emphasise the notion of city-regions, since TIs do not 
follow a logic of political-administrative borders. Local TIs rather operate in “soft spaces” 
(Haughton et al., 2010; Illsley et al., 2010). Depending on their field of action (mobility, energy, 
food, etc.), they act within completely different spatial geographies, often including urban, 
sub-urban and rural areas at the same time.  Such an agency oriented perspective is deliberate 
and implies a “flat” ontology compared to the hierarchical niche-regime distinction used in 
the MLP to investigate multi-level relations between niche-innovations, regimes and 
landscapes (Geels, 2010). Instead we study urban transitions as they unfold through the 
agency of local transition initiatives pushing for change in ways of organising, thinking and 
doing. 
With the notion of local transition initiatives, we build on the concept of urban 
experimentation as proposed by Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2012). They do not conceive of 
experiments in a formal scientific sense, but rather defined them as “purposive interventions 
in which there is a more or less explicit attempt to innovate, learn or gain experience” 
(Bulkeley & Castán Broto 2012, p. 363). These experiments give rise to new forms of 
statehood and urban governance as discussed by the literature on governance (see section 
2.1). They redraw the boundaries between public, private and civic engagement and establish 
new partnerships. 
However, our understanding of local transition initiatives is distinct from the notion of urban 
laboratories as outlined by Karvonen and van Heur (2014) and Evans and Karvonen (2014). 
These urban laboratories are formalised settings, “(1) involving a specific set-up of 
instruments and people that (2) aims for the controlled inducement of changes and (3) the 
measurement of these changes” (Karvonen & van Heur 2014, 383). Thus, they are defined by 
the combination of intervention and observation. While local TIs strive for innovation and 
societal change, they do not necessarily strive for systematic observation and evaluation. The 
ways by which learning and reflection occur vary considerably, often being more unintended 
and perhaps even unconscious than systematic and formalised. 
Building on the idea of a duality of structure and agency (Giddens, 1984), we suggest that 
local agency is embedded in and shaped by multi-level governance contexts (yet, not 
determined by them entirely). Consequently, the TIs navigate multi-level governance contexts 
with elements that are shared across city-regions (the EU and transnational context) and 
elements which are particular to the city-region (the national and sub-national context). 
Zooming in into the elements of context which differ between the city-regions, we examine 
four political systems: a centralised unitary state with low local autonomy in the United 
Kingdom (UK), a decentralised unitary state with high local autonomy in Sweden, 
“cooperative federalism” in Germany and “dual federalism” in Belgium.  
We propose that these different governance contexts - unitary and federal political systems - 
affect the dispersion of power between different governance levels, promoting either power 
sharing or power concentration. They can either support or impede local TIs to initiate, foster, 
and sustain urban sustainability transitions. Our findings show that the power sharing effects 
of federal political systems give TIs more room to manoeuvre than unitary political systems 
do. Our research confirms that attempts to govern sustainability transitions in general and 
urban sustainability transitions in particular are embedded in wider political-institutional 
contexts. The contribution of this paper is to propose an agency and governance focused 
analytical perspective which extends previous research on urban sustainability transitions by 
incorporating the multi-level governance nature of urban transitions. Empirically and 
conceptually, with the comparison of unitary and federal political systems, we also add to the 
literature on the role of institutions in sustainability transitions. Our findings confirm that 
“institutions do matter” and demonstrate how different political systems enable and/or 
constrain local agency. Our research illustrates the ambiguity of these wider governance 
contexts, often entailing both opportunities for and obstacles to urban sustainability 
transitions. 
The next section develops a multi-level governance perspective on urban sustainability 
transitions. After setting out the methodology in section 3, the empirical findings are 
presented in section 4 and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2 Theory: A multi-level governance perspective on urban sustainability 
transitions 
2.1 Governance: Beyond government, but not instead of 
How governments can effectively steer transitions into desired directions has been a key 
strand within the sustainability transitions literature from the very beginning. A number of 
scholars have developed a “transition management” approach (e.g. Kemp et al., 2007; 
Rotmans et al., 2001) which was also adopted for some time by the Dutch government (Kern 
and Smith, 2008; Smith and Kern, 2009). While sometimes criticised as a top-down approach 
to manage transitions (Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith et al., 2005), Loorbach (2010) has 
characterised the approach as a prescriptive, complexity governance framework which relies 
on the cooperation of a variety of different stakeholders or even as a new mode of 
governance itself (2007). While initially the approach was mainly designed with national or 
reginal governments in mind, more recently contributions have also highlighted the 
usefulness of the approach in the context of urban transitions (Wittmayer and Loorbach, 
2016).  
Another important contribution to the discussions about the governance of transitions in the 
transitions literature was the development of the idea of varying transition contexts: Smith 
et al. (2005, p. 1492) argued that “the particular form and direction of regime transformation, 
and the associated modes of governance, will depend on the transition context: a function of 
the availability of resources and how they are coordinated”. By focusing on resources of 
actors and their coordination, this approach provides greater room for the analysis of agency 
in the pursuit of transitions. Some of these contributions already explicitly draw on the wider 
political science literature on governance (e.g. Loorbach, 2007), but we argue that there is 
value in revisiting this literature. Especially given the increasing interest in urban sustainability 
transitions, we propose that the multi-level governance literature can add to our 
understanding of the governance of transitions.  
In the political science literature, the traditional understanding of government as the sole 
source of authority became contested already in the 1970s. This change has been 
accompanied by “proliferating centres of authority” (Rosenau, 2004, p. 32). For example 
Kooiman has argued that “[i]n diverse, dynamic and complex areas of societal activity no 
single governing agency is able to realise legitimate and effective governing by itself.” 
(Kooiman, 2003, p. 3). Along similar lines, Rhodes argues that governance reveals “the limits 
to governing by a central actor, claiming there is no longer a single sovereign authority. In its 
place, there is the multiplicity of actors specific to each policy area […]” (Rhodes, 1996, p. 
658). 
Thus, governance implies a crossing and redrawing of boundaries between the state and 
society (Bevir, 2010; Healey, 2006; Kooiman, 2003; Lynn, 2010; Peters and Pierre, 2004; 
Rhodes, 1996). However, these changes do not imply that governments do not play an 
important role any more. While some authors even heralded the era of “governance without 
government” (Rhodes, 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Peters and Pierre, 1998), others 
contend that governance has not led to a hollowing out of the state, but rather to a shift in 
the manner states exercise political authority (Benz, 2004; Lynn, 2010; Pierre and Peters, 
2000). The attempt to create a transition governance framework was very much based on this 
understanding of governance: that governments have to play a key role, but can only be 
effective in governing transitions with collaboration with actors from science, business and 
society (Wittmayer and Loorbach, 2016). 
Therefore, in our conceptual framework, we adopt a perspective in which different types of 
actors - public, private and third sector actors – are important governance actors. Kooiman 
defines governing, aptly for our interest in sustainability transitions, as “the totality of 
interactions, in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal 
problems or creating societal opportunities” (Kooiman, 2003, p. 4). Importantly, the “room to 
manoeuvre” of these actors is defined by hard power as well as soft power (Nye, 1990; Nye, 
2004; Stoker, 2011). While hard power is “the power of command and incentives”, soft power 
is “the power to get other people to share your ideas and vision” (Stoker 2011, p. 27). Hard 
power is the power of coercion, regulation or economic incentives whereas soft power is 
expressed through values, ideologies and ethos. Both hard and soft power combined are 
important for local agency in transitions and are distributed unequally across different actors. 
While the existing transitions literature often distinguishes between powerful regime 
incumbents and less powerful niche actors or grassroots coalitions (e.g. Hess, 2014), we argue 
that how hard and soft power is distributed is partly shaped by the multi-level governance 
context which includes the institutional structures of the political system within which actors 
operate. These issues will be explored in more detail in the following two sections.    
2.2 Multi-level governance 
In political science, it has long been established that governance does not simply take place 
at any one level but has been argued to often have a multi-level character with jurisdictions 
ranging from the international to the local level (Benz, 2007; Bevir, 2010; Marks and Hooghe, 
2004). These governance levels are interdependent and marked by multiple dynamics of 
interactions. Therefore, the strategies and activities of actors span across multiple 
jurisdictions (Peters and Pierre, 2004; cf. Benz, 2007; cf. Kern, 2014; cf. Smith, 2007).  
In the context of multi-level governance, these strategies and activities flow in a horizontal as 
well as a vertical direction (Geys and Konrad, 2011; Kern, 2014; Lee and Koski, 2015; Peters 
and Pierre, 2004; Rosenau, 2004). In a horizontal direction, the exchanges and knowledge 
flows between different city-regions are manifold (Derthick, 2010; Geys and Konrad, 2011; 
Lee and Koski, 2015). They are furthered by transnational municipal networks and 
environmental movements. While they might not necessarily influence policy decisions, their 
importance lies in the motivation of local activities (Lee and Koski, 2015). By sharing novel 
ideas, knowledge and experiences, they motivate and induce local action.  
In a vertical direction, the multi-levelness of the strategies and activities of state and non-
state actors is captured by the notion of “two-level games” (Putnam, 1988; cf. Zangl, 1995) 
that has later been extended into “multi-level games” (Mayer, 2011). It captures how actors 
try to overcome obstacles at their own governance level by making strategic use of 
negotiation processes at another level. For instance, domestic actors can refer to agreements 
of international negotiations (e.g. the Sustainable Developments Goals defined by the United 
Nations) to overcome domestic resistance to sustainability. Thus, actors learn to navigate 
across the multiple levels of governance. While it is acknowledged that the multiple levels of 
governance influence one another, the question of “when” and “how” (cf. Putnam, 1988) they 
do so remains a research gap.   
In contrast, much of the existing literature on how institutional structures influence transition 
governance exclusively focuses on one level of governance (often national or local). However, 
more recently, it has already been argued that “cities are enmeshed more or less strongly in 
multi-level governance relationships where, for example, cultures of centralisation (UK) or 
federalism (Germany) condition the nature of multi-level relationships” (Hodson and Marvin, 
2010, p. 481). Similarly, Bulkeley and Betsill (2005, p. 43) have contended that “multilevel 
governance perspectives can start to open up these divisions, and provide insight into the 
opportunities and contradictions which emerge in the interpretation and implementation of 
urban sustainability across a range of scales and spheres of governance”. However, studies of 
the effects of different institutional contexts on the agency of urban actors in the context of 
sustainability transitions from a systematic comparative perspective are scarce, despite 
Hodson and Marvin’s call for the need to better understand similarities and differences 
between urban contexts. 
In order to fill this gap in the literature, we argue that the extent and form of the dispersion 
of authority and governing across different governance levels is partly influenced by the 
political systems of nation states. These national political systems are the element of the 
multi-level governance context that differs between the city-regions. Given the interest in the 
transition literature on how institutions shape transitions, but also the lack of comparative 
studies of how exactly political systems shape the agency of actors to effect transitions, the 
focus of our proposed multi-level governance framework is to shed light on how the different 
national political structures shape the ability of urban actors to promote transitions in their 
respective city-regions.  
2.3 Federal versus unitary political systems 
One way to distinguish different national political systems and capture their dispersion of 
political authority across governance levels is through the notions of federal and unitary 
political systems (Anderson, 2008).  
A federal political system combines a union of constituent units with the autonomy and self-
governance of these units (Anderson, 2008; Watts, 1998). As they do so, all federal political 
systems combine elements of centralisation with elements of decentralisation. They have a 
minimum of two independent levels of governance (e.g. state and federal government like in 
the US). Two types of federal systems can be discerned: cooperative and dual ones. 
“Cooperative federalism” is characterised by shared competencies between the constituent 
units2 (e.g. in Germany). “Dual federalism” is characterised exactly by the separation of these 
competencies, avoiding any overlap of political authority between these constituent units 
(e.g. Belgium).  
In a unitary political system, the constituent units (e.g. local municipalities) can only exercise 
those powers that the central government has delegated to them and the national 
government can re-configure the dispersion of authority unilaterally. Unitary political systems 
can also be distinguished into two types: a centralised and a decentralised one. In 
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decentralised unitary states, political authority is delegated to the constituent units through 
devolution. They can hold manifold competencies, sometimes also encompassing territorial 
and/or financial autonomy (e.g. Sweden). In centralised unitary states, only one political 
centre exists - the national government -, assigning merely administrative functions to the 
constituent units (e.g. the UK). These features of unitary and federal political systems are 
depicted in Figure 1. 
[FIGURE 1 about here] 
The notion of hard power and soft power also pertains to these political institutions. Hard 
power as “the power of command and incentives” entails the power to change the rules of 
the game and the power over the distribution of financial resources. Soft power as “the power 
to get other people to share your ideas and vision” includes the power to provide political 
support and create legitimacy for sustainability activities.  
Hard power resources are allocated differently in federal and unitary systems. Federal and 
unitary systems are defined by the difference in who holds the authority to change the rules 
of the game. The difference between the two lies in the constitutional guarantee of the 
autonomy of the constituent units (Anderson, 2008; Watts, 1998). In federal political systems, 
the configuration of authority can only be changed in cooperation of the constituent units. By 
contrast, in unitary political systems, the central government can re-configure authority 
without the consent of the constituent units. Consequently, federal system disperse power 
and give local TIs (both state and non-state actors) more opportunities to shape the rules of 
the game. By contrast, unitary systems concentrate this power in the central government, 
making local TIs more dependent on central governance. 
The power over the distribution of financial resources differs not between federal and unitary 
systems per se, but rather between different types of federal and unitary political systems:  
 For federal political systems, financial relations are structured differently in “cooperative 
federalism” and “dual federalism”. In the “cooperative federalism” of Germany, sources of 
revenue are shared and redistributed across levels of governance by a complex system of 
vertical and horizontal exchanges (the so-called Länderfinanzausgleich). This gives local TIs 
more room to manoeuvre to utilise diverse sources of funding for local sustainability 
activities. By contrast, in the “dual federalism” of Belgium, the federal government retains 
the control over taxation (Swenden and Jans, 2006). Thus, local TIs are more dependent 
on the federal government for the provision of funding. 
 For unitary political systems, the difference between centralised and decentralised unitary 
states matters. In centralised unitary states such as the UK, the central government retains 
control over taxation and spending, while the municipalities have hardly any revenue 
sources of their own. This makes local TIs highly dependent on the central government for 
gaining financial support for sustainable action. Conversely, in the decentralized unitary 
state of Sweden, local autonomy is secured through fiscal politics and local sources of 
revenue. Therefore, local TIs dependent more on the municipalities for the provision of 
funding. 
While hard power is closely linked to the configuration of the political system – i.e. federal or 
unitary states – soft power is much less so. The soft power of providing political support and 
creating legitimacy for sustainability can be applied by state and non-state actors at all levels 
of governance, be it national, subnational or local. Here, we argue that the political system 
does not make a difference for fostering urban sustainability transitions. 
Sustainability is cross-cutting in nature, relating to different policy domains such as mobility, 
housing and urban development, energy or agriculture. Therefore, one also has to note that 
the extent of local autonomy may vary between policy domains (Pratchett 2004, 363). Thus, 
research on environmental policy shows that the nature of vertical, top-down influences also 
depends on the policy orientation of national governments (Lee and Koski 2015, 1505). If they 
disregard or even oppose the environmental policy agenda, they can be counterproductive 
for very innovative local communities. If they are supportive of environmental protection, 
they can foster local activities. This is most problematic for centralised unitary states, while, 
for the other political systems, it is as well, but to a lesser degree. 
Therefore, scholars highlight that vertical interaction should be understood not only in a top-
down, but also in a bottom-up fashion. This gave rise to the conception of “compensatory 
federalism” (Derthick, 2010). It suggests that “federalism works when governments at one 
level of the system are able to compensate for weaknesses or defects at another level” (ibid. 
p. 59). Thus, lower levels of governance are assigned the role of controlling the power of the 
national governments. This gives local TIs in federal states more leeway to initiative, sustain 
and defend local sustainability transitions than they do have in unitary states. 
This question of how tasks, rights and responsibilities should be allocated among different 
levels of governance has received ample attention in the literature (Geys and Konrad, 2011). 
Oates’ Decentralization Theorem suggests that the responsibility for public services should be 
assigned to the lowest level where both the benefits and the costs of these services are 
generated (Oates, 1999). This argument is the reasoning behind the principle of subsidiarity. 
It assumes that the sub-national and local governments are closer and, thus, more responsive 
to the needs of local communities than national governments are (Geys and Konrad, 2011; 
Oates, 1999). This argument has also been used to justify the increasing attention of transition 
scholars to the urban sustainability transitions (e.g. McCormick et al., 2013). 
Seeking to integrate the literature on multi-level governance with the literature on (urban) 
sustainability transitions, our analysis across four European city-regions, examines the 
following proposition: 
 As hard power is shared across multiple governance levels in federal political systems, 
they grant more autonomy to local actors to change the rules of the game and access 
diverse sources of funding. Therefore, federal systems give local actors more room to 
manoeuvre to navigate across the multiple levels of governance and to initiate, foster 
and sustain urban sustainability transitions. 
 Conversely, unitary political systems concentrate hard power either in the central 
government (centralised unitary state) or the municipalities (decentralised unitary 
state). By making local actors more dependent on either national politics or local politics 
for redefining the rules of the game and accessing funding schemes, they curtail their 
room to manoeuvre to navigate across the multiple levels of governance. 
 The soft power of raising political legitimacy by invoking values, ideologies and ethos 
can be applied by TIs to initiative, foster and sustain urban sustainability transitions. 
They can do so by referring to multiple levels of governance and both state and non-
state actors. Hence we argue that TIs can create and use soft power in all four political 
systems.  
We will now turn to describing the methodology through which we are testing these 
propositions. 
3 Methodology 
In our study, we explore how local transition initiatives that shape urban sustainability 
transitions are supported or hindered by the multi-level governance context in which they are 
embedded. We are doing that in a uni-directional manner, being primarily interested in how 
these multi-level governance contexts influence urban transitions. We do not investigate how 
urban sustainability transitions in general or local agency in particular might affect the wider 
multi-level governance context. Especially we are interested in the differences that can be 
observed, when we study the same phenomenon (local transition initiatives) in different 
national states with their specific political systems as described in the theory section. In order 
to explore such national differences, we decided to implement a case selection strategy of 
maximum diversity in national contexts, namely Belgium (Genk), Germany (Dresden), Sweden 
(Stockholm) and UK (Brighton). We conducted a comparative analysis following an 
“embedded multiple-case design” with the city-regions as the cases and the local TIs as the 
embedded unit of analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 46). Both cases (city-regions) and embedded units of 
analysis (local TIs) are embedded in a multi-level governance context. Figure 2 depicts this 
case study design. 
[FIGURE 2 about here] 
The multi-level governance context can be differentiated into a context that is common to all 
city-regions – constituted by EU and transnational politics – and a context that is specific to 
each city-region – constituted by national and sub-national politics. Based on the typology of 
federal and unitary political systems introduced above, the city-regions selected represent 
important variations in the national context they are embedded in. They range from the 
United Kingdom (UK) as a centralised unitary state with low local autonomy to Sweden as a 
decentralized unitary state with high local autonomy3. The former concentrates power in the 
national government and the latter in the single municipalities. While both are federalist, the 
federalisms of Germany and Belgium display very distinct characteristics. German 
“cooperative federalism” is founded on the entanglement of political authority whereas 
Belgian “dual federalism” is based on the exclusiveness of the same. Thus, in German 
“cooperative federalism”, cooperation and consensus between various governance levels are 
prescribed by formal-legal statute. Conversely, in Belgian “dual federalism”, each governance 
level can – at least in legal terms – operate (semi)autonomously. Here, the need for 
cooperation and consensus arises rather from the cross-cutting nature of policy issues, 
requiring the combined action of several governance levels. Both federalisms afford high 
autonomy to the municipalities.  
The common phenomenon we studied in these four different city-regions / states are local 
transition initiatives, which we defined as a group of people that strive for environmental 
sustainability in their city-region and that are physically located in this city-region. Based on 
that definition we mapped about 1004 initiatives (community gardens, energy cooperatives, 
repair-cafes etc.) in each city-region. 
Empirical data on how these initiatives manoeuvre within their multi-level governance 
contexts have been gathered through a systematic literature review and extensive 
documentary analysis to cover the multi-level governance context dynamics as well as desk 
research, the attendance of local events, and as semi-structured interviews in all city-regions 
to research the urban dynamics. Following the idea of triangulation, interviews were 
conducted with so-called helicopter viewers, insiders and outsiders of selected TIs. Helicopter 
viewers are key informants with extensive knowledge of the city-regions and the status of 
sustainability therein. While they are knowledge about local governance and TIs, they do not 
belong to any specific initiative. They are usually politicians or public officials, journalists, 
academics or members of local businesses. Insiders and outsiders of TIs were interviewed to 
gain a more balanced understanding of TIs’ activities. While insiders belong to the core of an 
initiative (e.g. founding member), outsiders know about the initiative (e.g. as consumer of 
organic food from a food cooperative) but do not belong to the inner circle. Thus, 33 
interviews were conducted in Brighton, 27 interviews in Dresden, 23 interviews in Genk and 
18 interviews in Stockholm. In all city-regions we interviewed persons acting in different 
sectors, namely public, business and civic (see Figure 3). Most of them were face-to-face 
interviews and only few were conducted via phone or Skype. 
[FIGURE 3 about here] 
                                                          
3 In Sweden, the relationship between the municipalities and the regional authorities varies. While some city-
regions have a tradition of strong regional coordination (e.g. Malmö and Gothenburg), others have a history of 
strong autonomy of the municipalities (e.g. Stockholm).    
4 For a full list of initiatives identified in each city-region please visit: www.acceleratingtransitions.eu 
For our analyses, we recorded, transliterated and coded the interviews5. Our coding scheme 
included codes for the EU, transnational governance, the national political systems, sub-
national governance (for example the Länder in Germany or regional authorities in Sweden) 
and the local governance within the city-regions. Examining the empirical data, we highlighted 
the opportunities and obstacles that arise from the varying governance arrangements. 
A limit of our study is that within the same national context the local conditions can differ 
considerably. Neither Dresden, nor Genk, Brighton or Stockholm can be perceived as typical 
city-regions for their countries, if something like this exist at all. We addressed that partly 
when we conducted a governance mapping for every of the four city-regions in order to 
identify aspects that are specific for these city-region. Brighton for example is the only city in 
the UK that is represented by a Green member of parliament, which is surely a relevant factor 
for the interplay of local initiatives and the national context in which they are embedded. 
These specifics are mentioned in the beginning of every empirical chapter. This, however, 
does not replace a comparative study of different city-regions within the same national 
context, which needs to be done by other studies. 
4 Urban sustainability transitions and their multi-level governance contexts 
4.1 Brighton - UK: A “hollowing out” of local governance by increasing centralisation and 
reducing local funding provides a difficult context for local agency  
As set out above, being a centralised unitary state, political power in the United Kingdom (UK) 
is concentrated in the central government and relatively little independent authority afforded 
to the municipalities (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Kern, 2014). Being a centralised unitary state 
with its concentration of hard power in the central government, the Brighton case can be 
seen as a ”most difficult” case in terms of the possibilities for the urban governance of 
transitions. While locally a green-led city council (2010-2015) was keen on the sustainability 
agenda and Brighton is the only city in the UK that is represented by a Green member of 
parliament, the wider institutional context is a challenging environment for bottom-up 
actions. 
In the UK, the national government has significant control over the sustainability activities of 
municipalities. For example, planning policy has been significantly hollowed out, removing 
most of the sustainability guidance and taking powers away from local authorities. National 
Planning Inspectors have significant powers over local plans and for example have recently 
requested changes to the Brighton and Hove City Plan One. In addition, the national Planning 
Inspectorate has recently threatened to take away all planning controls from Brighton and 
                                                          
5 The following three reports have been prepared by the ARTS Consortium to document the empirical findings 
of the data collection and data analysis: ‘D 2.3 - Governance Context Analysis of All Transition Regions’; ‘D 2.4 - 
Synthesis Report I: Comparative Analysis of the Acceleration Dynamics in Regions and Potential Acceleration 
Opportunities’; ‘D 3.2 - Case Study Reports: Background Reports and Reports on Transition Initiatives’. The ARTS 
Project (Accelerating and Rescaling Transitions to Sustainability). Grant agreement number 603654. 
http://acceleratingtransitions.eu/publications/. 
 
Hove City Council as a consequence of failing to hit central targets for new housing 
development (BT 4). 
The power position of the central government is further enhanced by the centralisation of 
fiscal politics. The Treasury has enormous influence over local governments through 
controlling income (local administrations depend to a large extent on budget allocations from 
central government) and expenditure (where the Treasury can limit expenditures in local 
councils). Municipalities in England have few tax-raising powers, apart from the council tax. 
In the wake of austerity following the financial crisis in 2008, the funding allocated to 
municipalities from central government has significantly reduced. As a consequence, since 
2012/13, Brighton and Hove Council has delivered around £75m of cuts to its spending (BHCC 
2016). Both trends – fiscal austerity and the recasting of planning authority – caused a 
retrenchment and “hollowing out” of local government in the UK, which has had knock-on 
effects on other local actors. Austerity put the Brighton and Hove City Council under acute 
financial pressure. It now struggles to finance statutory duties, let alone develop 
sustainability-related activities. Therefore, grants of the City Council to support local TIs such 
as the City Sustainability Partnership have been dropped and the staff capacity of the 
sustainability team of the City Council itself has been reduced. This raises concern because 
the sustainability team has been instrumental to the development of many local TIs, including 
the Hanover Action for Sustainable Living or the Brighton and Hove Food Partnership. 
Environmental and educational campaigns have particularly suffered since 2010 with certain 
TIs finding themselves “in a crisis, financially” because of the reduction in available project 
funding (BT 14). So in an institutional context where hard power was already concentrated in 
the national government, these recent trends have made the situation even more difficult for 
local councils and local actors more generally. This difficult political and financial context 
amounts to only limited opportunities for the local government to develop and implement 
policies that could foster a transition towards sustainability (BT 1; BT 2; BT 23). Activities such 
as the roll-out of solar PV pursued by the Brighton Energy Co-op, or changes to the local 
cycling infrastructure, are therefore very dependent on national policy incentives (such as 
feed-in tariffs). As a consequence, we observe that some local TIs are choosing to be much 
involved in national policy discussions than in engaging for example with the local council that 
has little to offer in terms of funding. Others (like the Brighton bike hub) are playing two-level 
games in that they engage locally with the council to promote cycling while also applying for 
national funding for such infrastructure investments. Several TIs very much depend on the 
vagaries of national politics because a shift in government can cause extensive changes to 
institutions and funding streams. 
Multi-level governance processes also impact on the distribution of soft power. For instance, 
the political shift towards a Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 undermined the 
local sustainability agenda and the common concern of all local political parties for 
sustainable development. According to interview evidence, it was exactly this shared concern 
for sustainability that had previously contributed to a local “fertile breeding ground” for TIs 
and provided legitimacy for sustainability activities (soft power).  
In summary, one of the key lessons learned from the Brighton case study is that even in a 
supportive political environment locally (soft power), progress has been limited and unevenly 
distributed across various empirical domains. This shows just how difficult the situation is for 
local actors to promote change. While the national context has become increasingly hostile 
to the environmental and low carbon agenda under the Conservative government since 2015, 
and is the locus of much of the hard power in this case, it also continues to provide some (but 
much reduced) opportunities for TIs. This case therefore confirms our proposition that 
centralised unitary political systems concentrate hard power in the central government, 
which reduces the room to manoeuvre for local actors, which in some instances are very much 
dependent on national politics and policies for support of their activities. This is particularly 
problematic at times when the national government agenda is not supportive of sustainability 
issues. However, the soft power of having an active ”green scene” of sustainability-minded 
actors (in the local council, businesses and civil society) nevertheless stimulated much activity 
locally and led to some progress. 
4.2 Stockholm - Sweden: Decentralisation as disintegration  
Quite the opposite of the UK, the Swedish decentralized unitary state provides for high local 
autonomy, including many environmental issues such as land use planning and environmental 
protection. This political decentralisation originated from the idea to safeguard democracy by 
limiting the distance between citizens and political decision-makers established by the strong 
labour unions that formed the social democrat party in the mid-1900s. The city-region of 
Stockholm consists of 26 municipalities and the autonomy of these municipalities is secured 
through fiscal politics and the authority over spatial planning among other things. Therefore, 
the regional authorities – the Stockholm County Administrative Board (SCAB, Länsstyrelsen i 
Stockholms län) which is the regional branch of the state and the Stockholm County Council 
(SCC, Stockholms Läns Landsting) which is a regional political entity with responsibility for 
health care, commuter transport and regional land use planning (the latter is not mandatory) 
- have more of a guiding position towards the municipalities. Yet, local autonomy limits the 
ability of regional authorities to steer by intervention and if they do so, then only with strong 
support from national legislation. However, the interplay between local and regional 
authorities differs across different parts of Sweden, with Stockholm region being one of those 
with very limited regional power. Stockholm is also the city with most municipalities within 
the city-region. The emphasis on local autonomy creates a very pronounced form of multi-
levelness in the city-region of Stockholm with the municipalities forming the core element.  
These fragmented governance structures impede the coordination and alignment of 
sustainability activities across the municipalities in the city-region. Against this backdrop, 
differences in the politics of sustainability between the municipalities within the city-region 
of Stockholm matter considerably. While some municipalities openly and actively promote 
sustainability and even are national frontrunners, others rather neglect it. One example is 
Södertälje municipality that in partnership with local TIs has become a role model and 
frontrunner regarding sustainable development in the food sector from production to 
consumption and waste management. One of the key factors for progress and expansion has 
been the local political support (ST 3, ST 7, ST 9). In other municipalities in the Stockholm city-
region, sustainable development is not on the political agenda and hence local sustainability 
TIs have difficulties in finding understanding for their activities, which is a prerequisite for 
gaining support (ST 5, ST 11, ST 13). This has resulted in a “localisation” of the perspectives of 
TIs, focusing on the local government as their immediate political setting and with very limited 
connections to the regional level. This situation very effectively curtails the potential role and 
impact local initiatives have on a transition of the city-region. It also means that the strategies 
for navigating this local political setting vary greatly, depending on what municipality the TI is 
working in. Is the main challenge to become acknowledged by decision makers in order to 
start a communication and get visibility, or is it to seek partnership for getting a more solid 
support? Given the changing politics at municipal level, the relations with local TIs also 
change. This is exemplified by some long-term civil society TIs that has been pending between 
being conflictual or participatory in their approach towards the municipality (Mietala, 2012).  
The disconnect between governance levels influences the allocation of hard power resources. 
National or regional funding programmes are not tuned to local circumstances or easily 
adapted to changed local conditions (WS 1-3, FG 3). This has considerably constrained TIs in 
their efforts to find financial support, because they would not fit into these pre-defined 
schemes. The funding support that exists is commonly temporary, following specific political 
directions, and tends to promote innovative start up initiatives during a shorter time (e.g. 2-
3 years). After this time, there are very limited possibilities for continued financial support 
and there is a belief that the initiatives will be economically self-sustaining. This so-called 
“projectification of funding” (Borgström et al., 2016) is a major barrier expressed by many TIs 
in the Stockholm city-region (WS 1-3, FG 1-3).  
The access to funding also illustrates the link between hard power and soft power resources. 
Governmental funding often requires the partnership of TIs with local authorities – either the 
municipality or city-districts. This makes funding dependent on how well the TIs are 
recognized by these local authorities and the existing relations between them. More 
importantly, it creates a divide between the traditional civic associations with a long-standing 
reputation and networks with public organisations and more recently emerged TIs that have 
not established their position within the city-region, yet or do not want to (ST 5, ST 9). This 
evidently impacts the strategies in terms of navigating the governance context, where many 
traditional associations have the trust capital, but where newer initiatives struggles to get 
acknowledged, trusted and hence supported.  
Nonetheless, the long-term tradition of local public associations and civic participation has 
been an important engine for sustainability activities in Stockholm. It is a source of soft power 
that has enabled well-established and trusted NGOs to participate in debates about the future 
development and strategic decision-making in the city-region (ST 7). This tradition is closely 
linked to the ideology of decentralised decision-making in Sweden. Interaction with these 
associations has been a well-known way of securing citizens participation in urban 
development for a long time. However, the authorities have large difficulties in finding ways 
to set up dialogues with the new forms of engagement.  
In an effort to overcome the obstacles posed by the governance context and increase their 
room to manoeuvre, TIs engage in multi-level games and seek cooperation to gain recognition 
and political voice vis-à-vis local and regional authorities (soft power). In so doing, horizontal 
networks such as the network of urban gardeners within Stadsodling Stockholm, which 
connects the various urban farming groups and actors in Stockholm, help TIs to have a 
stronger voice in the city-region. This is an attempt to move in the same direction as the cities 
of Gothenburg and Malmoe, where urban farming is much more recognised by the authorities 
(ST 14). In a similar vein, the cooperation with transnational networks has enabled TIs to raise 
their legitimacy and to justify their commitment to sustainability vis-à-vis local sceptics and 
opponents. For example, the Transition Movement Värmdö questions existing societal 
structures like the objective of economic growth, and believes that the current crisis can only 
be solved by replacing these very structures. As this puts it into conflict with many 
incumbents, the collaboration with a network of like-minded initiatives like the Transition 
Town Movement or with more established institutions like the church, is crucial to back its 
arguments (ST 11).   
TIs (especially those working locally, but in many places in the city-region) also play games 
across the multiple levels of this decentralised system by using the different situations in 
different municipalities to showcase and hence inspire sustainable ways of organising, 
thinking and doing, for example the Green wedge TI (Kilsamverkan Storstockholms gröna 
kilar). The regional actors also use this strategy to foster progress in all the municipalities in 
the region.  
In Stockholm, the governance context is characterised by a disconnect between levels and 
types of actors, which slows down the implementation of the national and regional level 
sustainable development ambitions. Even if disconnected, the main source of funding is from 
the national government (hard power), which has very limited knowledge about the local 
level due to this fragmentation. On the other hand, the decentralisation supports a high 
diversity of alternative solutions in the city-region and a strong local contextualisation of 
these. This provides the opportunity for TIs to invoke the exemplary role of other initiatives 
in other city-regions or horizontal networks to raise the legitimacy of their engagement. 
Consequently, the Stockholm case study illustrates how TIs depend upon one level of 
governance for the allocation of hard power in a unitary political system. At the same time, it 
shows how the TIs navigate across the levels of the decentralised Swedish state to gain soft 
power and compensate for the limits imposed on them by this concentration of hard power. 
4.3 Dresden - Germany: “Cooperative federalism” as multi-levelness  
German “cooperative federalism” is constituted by the entanglement of the federal 
government, the sixteen semi-autonomous states (henceforth the Länder), and the autonomy 
of the municipalities. As the implementation of federal legislation belongs mainly to the 
jurisdiction of the Länder, German “cooperative federalism” provides for joint decision-
making of the federal government and the Länder on federal legislation in the Second 
Chamber (Bundesrat). In this context, consensual modes of conflict resolution – such as 
unanimous consensus and supermajorities – prevail over majoritarian decisions and 
hierarchical steering (Schmidt, 2003). 
This intergovernmental entanglement is based upon the principles of subsidiarity and 
solidarity. These are enshrined in the constitutional principle of “uniform” or at least 
“equivalent living conditions” among the Länder (Art. 106 and Art. 72 German Basic Law). This 
is a unique feature of German federalism that distinguishes it from other federal systems 
around the world (von Beyme, 2004; Rudzio, 2003; Scharpf, 2005). It gave rise to a system of 
both vertical and horizontal fiscal redistribution between the national government, the 
Länder, and the municipalities. Vertical redistribution from the federal government to the 
Länder is complemented by horizontal fiscal redistribution between the Länder to balance 
economic disparities and unequal tax revenues between the poorer and the richer Länder 
(Scharpf, 2005).  
In the myriad of vertical and horizontal linkages created by German “cooperative federalism”, 
the responsibilities for defining the rules of the game and providing public funding (hard 
power) are allocated differently for each policy domain. Therefore, “cooperative federalism” 
led to a “multi-levelisation” of the perspectives and activities of the TIs, addressing the federal 
government, the Saxon government or transnational organizations and networks depending 
upon the domain they engage in.  
This is illustrated by the domains of urban development and energy production. In urban 
planning and building, the local public administration could shield the local green space 
Hufewiesen against building plans of the owner by invoking the “National Act on the 
Protection Against Aircraft Noise” and the “Saxon Law on Flood Protection”, even though 
support by local politics was lacking (DD 25).     
In the energy domain, the development of the Citizens’ Power Plants, promoting 
decentralized renewable energy installations in the city-region, highly depended on national 
renewable energy policy. With the introduction of a feed-in tariff by the German Renewable 
Energy Act of 2000, renewable energy installations turned profitable and the Citizens’ Power 
Plants expanded (DD 20). However, when the act was amended and the feed-in tariff reduced 
in 2011, their development slowed down significantly. Moreover, the political priorities of the 
Saxon government in energy policy, which seek an expansion of conventional energy, impede 
the activities of the Citizens’ Power Plants. This holds especially for wind energy, where 
regional planning processes have stalled.  
The TIs struggled especially with the so-called “projectification of funding” (Borgström et al., 
2016), because short-term, project-based funding schemes created high uncertainty for 
them. In some instances, this even caused some key activists to withdraw from the TIs (DD 
18). To overcome this problem, some TIs engaged in political lobbying, reaching across 
governance levels, to change the governance context itself. For example, in the domain of 
education, a TI cooperated with the Saxon-wide Network for Development Policy 
(Entwicklungspolitisches Netzwerk Sachsen) to convince the Saxon government to 
institutionalise a co-financing scheme for education for sustainable development, which 
already exists in other German Länder. This change in the provision of funding was intended 
to create more stability for the activities of the TI. 
TIs navigated across the levels of governance not only in a vertical, but also in a horizontal 
direction. Thus, civil society initiatives – that form an element of transnational politics – 
opened more flexible and at times more experimental ways of support to TIs. For example, 
various foundations helped TIs by providing funding in a much more “unbureaucratic” 
manner than the public funding of state institutions (DD 4; DD 5; DD 6; DD 9; DD 10; DD 25). 
This enabled smaller TIs with fewer resources to receive support that otherwise would not 
have been able to handle complex funding applications. 
Apart from these hard power resources, TIs used the multi-levelness of governance to invoke 
the soft power of values and knowledge and create legitimacy for urban sustainability 
transitions. They deliberately referred to sustainability initiatives at other governance levels 
or in other city-regions to create political pressure locally. In so doing, they emphasized the 
need of “keeping up with the trend” (DD 13). One such trend are local currencies. Although 
they were neglected by local authorities in Dresden, they have been endorsed by German 
National Urban Development Policy (DD 29). With reference to this national policy, the local 
currency Elbtaler could raise its own legitimacy. 
In a similar vein, TIs benefited from the exchange of knowledge and experience in 
transnational networks. For example, for the urban gardening network, the national 
foundation “anstiftung & ertomis”, which published an Urban Gardening Manifest, and the 
Academy of Permaculture have been important sources of inspiration and reflection (DD 4; 
DD 5; DD 10). By sharing positive and negative lessons between urban gardeners, the 
foundation helped the network to avoid some of the mistakes of earlier initiatives and evolve 
in a more effective manner. 
The entanglement created by German “cooperative federalism” caused a “multi-levelisation” 
of the perspectives of the TIs. They learned to navigate across the levels of governance in both 
a vertical and a horizontal direction. In German “cooperative federalism”, the responsibilities 
to define the rules of the game and the access to funding sources vary between the different 
domains. Therefore, the dynamics of supporting or hindering urban sustainability transitions 
are domain-specific. Yet, in line with the notion of “compensatory federalism” (cf. Derthick, 
2010), TIs could invoke the soft power of creating legitimacy and exchanging knowledge by 
referring to exemplary action at other levels of governance, where hard power resources 
were not accessible to them.  
4.4 Genk- Belgium: “Dual federalism”, both enabling and hindering a pioneering local 
government 
While also federalist, Belgian “dual federalism” is quite distinct from German “cooperative 
federalism”. Where German federalism is characterised by entanglement, Belgian federalism 
features separation. It can be described by three main characteristics: the exclusive division 
of competences, the principle of no hierarchy and the Europeanization of inter-governmental 
relations within Belgium (Happaerts, 2015).   
In line with “dual federalism”, the competences are divided in an exclusive manner between 
the federal government, the three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) and the three 
Communities (Flemish, French and German-speaking) (Beyers and Bursens, 2006a). The 
principle of no hierarchy prescribes that “the federal government cannot impose something 
on sub-national governments and those cannot be bound by federal legislation” (Happaerts, 
2015, p. 288; cf. Jans and Tombeur, 2000; cf. Swenden, 2006). Therefore, policy-making is 
never hierarchical, but always based on a consensus among equal partners. Yet, the federal 
government has the control over taxation, the part and parcel of all policy-making (Swenden 
and Jans 2006). In this context, external pressure by EU or international policy commitments 
is essential to forge agreement between different levels of governance within Belgium 
(Beyers and Bursens, 2006b; GK 20-23). This has resulted in the Europeanisation of 
intergovernmental relations (Happaerts, 2015). 
In addition, Belgium has been going through several processes of political state reform, 
adding complexity and incoherence of responsibilities across all levels (Swenden and Jans, 
2006; GK 20-23). In this context, the federal government retained considerable authority to 
define regulation and the policy orientation in single policy domains (hard power). This multi-
level architecture has so far reproduced a status quo in environmental and climate policy 
(Happaerts, 2013; Maesschalck and Van De Walle, 2006) which is reinforced by a lack of 
ambitious visions for energy, transport and food policy for example. The current approach is 
thus more an approach of “managing unsustainability” (focussing on the symptoms instead 
of the causes) in the way that current market-driven, growth-oriented economic 
development can continue (Blühdorn, 2007). In energy policy for example, the federal 
government took the controversial decision to extent the operation of nuclear power plants. 
This sustains the energy monopoly of the main energy producer, Electrabel, and impedes a 
transition towards renewable energy. Even though pioneering local governments such as 
Genk seek to curb carbon emissions by expanding renewable energy, this political decision of 
the federal government significantly hinders local action.  
The current “management of unsustainability” approach is further reinforced by austerity 
discourses, which dominate current Belgian political discourses, by cuts in investments and 
activities in environmental policy (GK 2; GK 6; GK 9; GK 20-23). Therefore, in contrast to the 
innovative potential that is often associated with the dispersion of power, Belgian federalism 
provides rather a case for policy failure (Happaerts, 2015).  
Only in the domain of resource use, the governance context is actually supportive of local 
sustainability transitions (GK 1; GK 8; GK 9; GK 18; GK 21-23). The dominant focus on waste 
reduction and the transformative transition approach of OVAM, the Public Flemish Waste 
Company, induced a shift from waste to materials legislation. This supported the initiation, 
replication and growth of re-use centers and compost masters. It paved the way for 
community initiatives, such as pass-on shops, pass-on markets or repair cafés, to sprout and 
replicate. It also encouraged circular gardening as promoted by Velt. In addition, the current 
Flemish government included the notion of a circular economy in its new policy plan. This 
supports TIs promoting sustainable resource use. 
At the same time, “dual federalism” with the division of hard power resources across the 
federal government, the intermediate level of Regions and Communities, as well as the 
municipalities created room to manoeuvre for a pro-active local government in Genk. The 
current government of Genk has sought to renew and recast the city-region (GK 13; GK 14; 
GK 16). The coalition of the CD & V and PROgenk (a collective of the Socialist Progressive 
Party, Greens and Independents) gained power with the elections of 2012. Under the new 
coalition government, the city administration acted as a mediator and facilitator for TIs (GK 
3-5; GK 7; GK 10-14; GK 16). It helped them to navigate across the levels of governance to find 
cooperation partners and funding opportunities, where political support by the federal 
government was lacking. Thus, similarly to German federalism, Belgian federalism led to a 
“multi-levelisation” of the perspectives and activities of local TIs (GK 6; GK 8-11; GK 13; GK 14; 
GK 16; GK 18).  
Accordingly, district managers guided TIs in acquiring public funding from Flemish, Belgian or 
EU funding programmes. As a result, many TIs were established, developed and sustained 
through external funding. It is also remarkable that many TIs succeeded in applying for EU 
funding. For example, the organic allotment gardens acquired INTERREG funding through the 
SUN project to establish a second initiative in 2008 (GK 10-11; GK 16). In a similar vein, the 
community currency Zetjes was supported by a community builder of Stebo and evolved from 
the multi-level cooperation between the initiative “Genk beloont” of the City of Genk and the 
e-wallet project of Limburg.net (CCIA; GK 1; GK 3; GK 12). This enabled it to participate in the 
EU INTERREG programme “Community Currencies in Action”. 
The empirical findings in Genk illustrate that Belgian “dual federalism” both promotes and 
hinders an urban sustainability transition. Given the division of responsibilities, the federal 
government retained hard power in defining the policy orientation and the allocation of 
funding in single policy domains. Where higher levels of governance were ambitious such as 
in the resource domain, they supported sustainable alternatives such as re-use and home 
composting. In most other domains, however, sustainability was mostly side-lined by the 
prevailing logic of market-driven, growth-oriented development. This “management of 
unsustainability” was reinforced by austerity discourses. This heavily impeded an urban 
sustainability transition. At the same time, “dual federalism” provided room to manoeuvre 
for the policy entrepreneurship of the local government. It used the multi-levelness of 
federalism to foster the empowerment and access of bottom-up initiatives to funding 
sources.   
5 Discussion 
5.1 Common obstacles for urban sustainability transitions 
Despite the differences in national governance contexts, TIs in the four city-regions have been 
confronted with common obstacles. Most importantly, this has been the current trend of a 
“projectification of funding” (Borgström et al., 2016). This trend has been reinforced by 
governments’ focus on cost-optimisation and effectiveness. Especially TIs whose new ways of 
ways of organising, thinking and doing provide a common good are often unable to turn them 
into profitable and self-sustaining activities. Therefore, they often rely on external support. 
This dependence is exacerbated by the “projectification of funding”. It created institutional 
conditions in which it is much easier to obtain short-term, project-based funding than long-
term funding that would help to sustain TIs. The design of these funding schemes appears to 
follow business models with an expectation that initiatives would become self-sufficient after 
an initial start-up phase (Sjöblom and Godenhjelm, 2009). However, the idea of self-
sufficiency as expressed by the “projectification of funding” fundamentally contradicts the 
voluntary, non-for-profit character of many civil society TIs.  
In contrast to this short-term, project-based funding, governmental support beyond 
“seeding” is often lacking even though it is crucial to ensure the continuity of TIs. TIs, 
therefore, face a situation of high uncertainty and instability. This puts a severe strain on their 
efforts to promote sustainability. 
The trend of a “projectification of funding” demonstrates that governance settings are not 
only shaped by constitutional choices such as unitary or federal political systems. On the 
contrary, it shows that the trends and practices of providing public funding can be quite 
similar and, thus, independent of these constitutional choices.  
5.2 Common opportunities for urban sustainability transitions 
Promoting sustainability transitions within the city-regions has been an opportunity for 
strengthening the ties between the TIs and for building capacity for governing local 
sustainability. TIs have benefited from devising new ways of collaboration to be recognised 
by local authorities. Thus, they benefited from partnering and unifying their voice for 
promoting and negotiating sustainable solutions and practices vis-à-vis the local 
governments. In a similar vein, navigating multi-level governance contexts asks TIs to develop 
new skills and competences. These newly-established practices can be seen as an opportunity 
for the governance of urban sustainability transitions in the future.  
Moreover, all of the countries studied here are EU member states characterised by 
democracy and the rule of law. This democratic setting provides the opportunity of openness 
to criticism, enabling TIs to voice opposing views about sustainability within the city-regions. 
The existing multiple governance contexts - even when not actively promoting sustainability 
- do not impede or penalize public criticism (as authoritarian political systems do). This allows 
local non-state actors to compensate for inaction by the state and fill a perceived void of 
sustainability institutions (see also Derthick, 2010). This is an opportunity for developing 
institutions of reflexive governance that allow for critical reflection and learning.   
5.3 The duality of structure and agency 
The notion of a duality of structure (Giddens, 1984) suggests that the relationship between 
structure and agency is a reciprocal one. Structures not only define agency, but agents also 
adapt to and redefine structural contexts. This is evinced by the comparison of the four city-
regions. As the empirical examples of agency illustrate, the governance settings leave room 
to manoeuvre for entrepreneurship by TIs and individuals.  
TIs across the city-regions have learnt to navigate the specific governance arrangements 
within which they operate. This has induced dynamics of “nationalisation” in Brighton within 
a centralised unitary state where some TIs were actively engaging in national policy-making 
to produce more favourable contexts for their activities. It has led to a “localisation” in 
Stockholm within a decentralised unitary state where TIs directed their activities towards the 
municipalities as their immediate political setting. It has caused a “multi-levelisation” in 
Dresden and Genk with “cooperative” and “dual federalism” where TIs directed their 
activities towards multiple governance levels to mobilise support for local action. 
Yet, our empirical findings reveal that TIs are not only “passively” shaped by their governance 
contexts, but also “actively” reshape these contexts. This is exemplified by combined 
strategies of drawing resources from the governance context and of reshaping this 
governance context. Thus, TIs across the city-regions have engaged in political activism to 
challenge, redefine, and recast governance settings, including EU, transnational, national or 
subnational policies and institutions. They have done so in one of the following ways: by 
lobbying for new funding schemes, advisory bodies or legal frameworks that would support 
and protect new ways of organising, thinking, and doing. For instance, the pioneering 
initiative of organic allotment gardens in Genk has paved the way for the creation of new 
funding schemes by the Flemish government, resulting in replication all over Flanders. In 
Stockholm, TIs used the frontrunner municipalities to convince other municipalities to follow.  
TIs in Stockholm show that a strong voice is needed to appeal and be recognised by the local 
authorities and employ collaboration as a way to overcome the fragmented and disconnected 
governance structures of the city-region. Similarly community energy groups in Brighton seek 
to influence national policies on community energy either by cooperating with organisations 
such as Community Energy England in order to lobby the national energy regulator and by 
contacting their local Members of Parliament.  
While the governance context can be constraining to local sustainability actions in the ways 
discussed in the empirical analysis and while our framework has been focused on uni-
directional linkages from higher governance levels to the urban level, our empirical analysis 
suggests that such linkages are better conceptualised as two way relationships. TIs are also 
increasingly active in shaping their multi-level governance context through individual or 
collective action. 
5.4 Unitary versus federal political systems: revisiting the proposition 
The comparison of the four diverse governance contexts and their effects on urban 
sustainability governance indicates that unitary political systems with hard power 
concentration on one specific level create a much higher dependence of TIs on that single 
level of governance. By contrast, federal political systems with a dispersion of hard power 
give TIs more leeway in responding to the opportunities and obstacles provided by 
governance settings.  
The centralised unitary state of the UK concentrates hard power in the national government 
whereas the decentralised unitary state of Sweden concentrates it in local governments. 
Therefore, TIs depend much more on the vagaries of national or local politics. If supportive of 
sustainability, they can accelerate urban sustainability transitions. Yet, the opposite often 
means a deceleration, stagnation, or even reversal of progress as seems currently the case in 
the UK.  
The comparison of the centralised unitary state of the UK with the decentralised unitary state 
of Sweden further shows the ambiguity of governance settings, entailing both opportunities 
and obstacles for local agency. It particularly reveals the tension between coordination and 
integration on the one hand and diversity and creativity on the other. The centralisation of 
the UK potentially allows for more effective coordination and integration of action on 
sustainability. However, this comes with a pressure for uniformity that undermines creativity 
and diversity between different local settings. As there is no “one best way” towards 
sustainability, this reliance on a uniform pattern might create new lock-ins and dead ends.  
On the other hand, the decentralisation in Sweden can foster innovativeness and diversity 
between municipalities. It is exactly this room for experimentation and this combination of 
multiple approaches that is essential to sustainability transitions (Biggs et al. 2012). It allows 
for exploring diverse ways of organising, thinking, and doing that can speak to diverse local 
audiences. Based upon these diverse approaches, weaknesses of one approach can be 
counter-balanced by the strengths of another one. This implies that one political system – 
centralised or decentralised unitary states - is not necessarily better at fostering sustainability 
transitions than the other one. Each system rather has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Federalism with a combination of both centralisation and decentralisation disperses political 
hard power across multiple governance levels. This gives TIs more opportunities to confront 
scepticism and resistance towards sustainability at one level by referring to support at other 
levels. It enables them to exploit “windows of opportunity” that arise from the interaction 
between these levels and play “multi-level games” (cf. Putnam, 1988). In some instances, 
these “multi-level games” are used not only to exploit existing opportunities, but also to 
create new ones by reshaping the governance context itself (as outlined above).  
Thus, compared with Brighton and Stockholm, TIs in Dresden and Genk face a different type 
of opportunity structure. They find it comparatively easier to uphold sustainability activities 
also in the face of ignorance or opposition by national, sub-national, or local governments.  
Figure 4 gives an overview over the opportunities and obstacles arising from specific 
governance settings. 
[FIGURE 4 about here] 
Revisiting our proposition, it can be argued that federalism (as in Germany and Belgium) with a 
combination of centralisation and decentralisation has power-sharing effects. These give TIs 
more opportunities to initiate, sustain, and defend urban sustainability transitions. It enables 
them to play “multi-level games”. As competences are shared, also national and sub-national 
governments can actively promote urban sustainability transitions by adopting a facilitating 
role (e.g. changing the rules of the game) to go beyond “symbolic” low-carbon discourses. 
However, many scholars emphasize that federalism itself is embedded in wider political and 
societal institutions and, therefore, the impact of federalism is context-specific (Benz, 2002; 
Watts, 1998).   
By contrast, unitary political systems concentrate political power either in the central 
government or the local municipalities. This makes local actors more dependent on national 
or local politics. At the same time, the comparison between the two unitary states UK and 
Sweden – one centralised and the other decentralised – evinces that the governance of 
sustainability transitions needs to strike a subtle balance between coordination and 
integration and diversity and creativity. Both integrating the efforts of multiple actors and the 
critique and innovation that arise from diversity are necessary to foster sustainability 
transitions. 
Moreover, we have overserved, that TIs in all four countries try to use soft power mechanisms 
of raising political legitimacy by invoking values, ideologies and ethos in order to foster urban 
sustainability transitions. Soft power mechanisms are used for both to reinforce supportive 
hard power but also to compensate a lack of supportive hard power. The latter is especially 
important in unitary states, where hard power is concentrated on one level. However, the 
effects of soft power mechanisms have clear limits and cannot compensate a lack of hard 
power in its entirety.  
6 Conclusion 
Attempts to govern sustainability transitions in general and urban sustainability transitions in 
particular are embedded in wider political-institutional contexts. Therefore, proposing an 
agency and a governance focused perspective, we have extended previous research on urban 
sustainability transitions by incorporating the multi-level governance nature of urban 
transitions. Our starting point was that in order to understand the dynamics of urban 
sustainability governance, and in particular the opportunities and obstacles which are 
influenced by given governance arrangements, research needs to look beyond the local level. 
It needs to include other governance levels from the sub-national to the national, EU and 
transnational level. 
With the comparison of unitary and federal political systems, we add to the literature on the 
role of institutions in sustainability transitions. Our findings confirm that “institutions do 
matter” and demonstrate how they enable and/or constrain local agency. Our research 
illustrates the ambiguity of these wider governance contexts, often entailing both 
opportunities for and obstacles to urban sustainability transitions. Therefore, our empirical 
findings show how important it is to protect the autonomy of local actors to enable them to 
react to these varying conditions. The power-sharing effects of federalism help to empower 
local actors by dispersing political power across multiple levels and, by doing so, enabling local 
actors to draw on different governance levels. This enables them to counter-balance and 
compensate for inaction or ignorance by one level by referring to another one. 
Future research could explore these multi-level dynamics more in-depth. It could study the 
relationship between urban sustainability transitions and multi-level governance contexts as 
a two-way relationship, considering the feedback loops and impacts between them. It could 
examine if and how urban transitions and local agency can transform the ways of organising, 
thinking, and doing at other governance levels. It could study if and how city-regions acquire 
the role of hubs for experimentation and innovation that inspire other governance levels 
(Bulkeley et al., 2011; Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Castán Broto and Bulkeley, 2013). In 
so doing, it could compare how different national governance arrangements influence the 
ability of city-regions to do so. This calls for more integrative theory-building and more inter-
disciplinary collaboration between the study of sustainability transitions, urban governance 
and political science more widely. 
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Figure 1: A typology of unitary and federal political systems 
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Figure 3: Overview of conducted interviews in the four city-regions 
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 Figure 4: The opportunities and obstacles arising from specific governance settings 
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